We defend the view that belief is a psychological category against a recent attempt to recast it as a normative one. Tamar Gendler has argued that to properly understand how beliefs function in the regulation and production of action, we need to contrast beliefs with a class of psychological states and processes she calls “aliefs.” We agree with Gendler that affective states as well as habits and instincts deserve more attention than they receive in the contemporary philosophical psychology literature. But (...) we argue that it is a serious error to align beliefs with the norm of rationality, while building a contrasting category whose members are characterized primarily by their failure to measure up to that normative standard, since these latter ones cannot constitute a distinct psychological category. First, we demonstrate that Gendler gets unwarranted conclusions about the existence of aliefs from belief-discordant cases. Next, we argue that the concept of alief is insufficiently clear. Aliefs cannot be distinguished from other types of states, such as beliefs. Also, when grouping many states under the category of aliefs, Gendler overlooks important differences between phenomena that are clearly distinct, such as habits and instincts. Aliefs simply do not constitute a legitimate psychological category. (shrink)

One of the most pervasive and persistent questions in philosophy is the relationship between the natural sciences and traditional philosophical categories such as metaphysics, epistemology and the mind. _Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism and Its Implications _is a unique and valuable contribution to the literature on this issue. It brings together a remarkable collection of highly regarded experts in the field along with some young theorists providing a fresh perspective. This book is noteworthy for bringing together committed philosophical naturalists, thus diverging from (...) the growing trend towards anti-naturalism. The book consists of four sections: the first deals with the metaphysical implications of naturalism, in which two contributors present radically different perspectives. The second attempts to reconcile reasons and forward-looking goals with blind Darwinian natural selection. The third tackles various problems in epistemology, ranging from meaning to natural kinds to concept learning. The final section includes three papers each addressing a specific feature of the human mind: its uniqueness, its representational capacity, and its morality. In this way the book explores the important implications of the post-Darwinian scientific world-view. (shrink)

Once upon a time, Aristotelean teleologists studied the natural world, both organic and inorganic, with the goal of revealing the divinely imposed ul- timate purpose of things. Things have changed. Galileo’s mathematization of physics removed Aristotelean final causes from the inorganic part of the natural world: that is a settled matter. Darwin then completed this revolu- tion in the sciences by extending it to the organic part of the natural world. But there is considerable room for disagreement, even among naturalists, (...) about just what the terms of the cease-fire were at the cessation of that revo- lutionary conflict. What is the relationship between Darwin’s contributions to natural science and the prospects for purposes or reasons in the organic sphere? Some twenty-first-century naturalists believe that Darwin removed final causes from the organic part of the natural world. For these thinkers, quite literally, there really is no purpose to life. But some post-Darwinian naturalists think Darwin actually made biology a kind of safe haven for teleological theorizing. These thinkers tend to cast such claims in episte- mological as opposed to metaphysical terms, so there are by no means neo- Aristoteleans; but by the same token, they certainly do think that the study of living things is different in kind, and not just degree from the study of nonliving things. This collection of essays explores the possibilities for novel approaches to the study of metaphysics, epistemology, rationality, and the human mind in a post-Darwinian intellectual landscape. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that there exists a class of immoral beliefs. These beliefs are immoral not for the usual reasons, i.e. because of their tendency to cause harm, their immoral acquisition, or the fact that they involve unjustified moral judgments. Rather, the class of beliefs to which I wish to draw attention includes beliefs that do not even have any moral content, but whose non-moral content is still morally significant. These beliefs are immoral because holding them constitutes an (...) immoral condition of the belief-holder. This usually involves a moral failure of the belief-holder. We may object to such beliefs for all of the usual reasons, but I wish to draw attention to their objectionable content based on the kind of character they represent a person as having.1. (shrink)

In this chapter, I wish to present an account of virtue ethics that does not base virtue solely on dispositions to behave in some way, but in the set of psychological states attributed to a person. In doing so, this modified account deals with all the problems the traditional virtue ethicist faces. I will start this chapter by presenting the main objections to virtue ethics: first, that it does not tell one how to act (which a moral theory should be (...) aimed at); second, that virtues are culturally dependent; and third, that people don’t have a fixed character since their actions are too context- dependent. I will then move on to explain a new naturalized approach to virtue ethics, one taking some insights about how to think of intentional states from Dan Dennett. I will show how this new account deals with the problems raised for virtue ethics. I will then present additional advantages of this theory and explain how, contrary to some objections, this still is a version of virtue ethics. (shrink)

The exclusive use of evolutionary explanations and game theory to justify moral claims has led economists to an impasse. Our discussion of this problem is focused on arguments made by Kenneth Binmore and Herbert Gintis, two vocal and notable economists behind these efforts. We begin by pointing out the false dilemma they present between ethical theories involving dubious non-naturalist metaphysics and their versions of naturalized game-theoretic ethics. We do so by, first, discussing alternative naturalist accounts, namely, those of Peter Railton (...) and Richard Boyd. Second, we argue that their descriptive and explanatory theories are in fact committed to substantive normative claims. Our hypothesis is that their attempts to avoid ethical arguments are responsible for their mistaken belief that theirs is a scientific disagreement, whereas it is in fact one about human nature. Binmore and Gintis’s disagreement about ethical claims requires acknowledging and engaging with substantive normative arguments such as those of what is good and what ought to be done. The alternative would be a never-ending disagreement on the fundamental view of human nature. This path, we worry, may be a road to nowhere. (shrink)

In his recent book on skill and virtue, Matt Stichter provides an account based on work in empirical psychology, specifically on self-regulation. In this paper I wish to argue that while this account is novel and well informed, it falls short. I present several examples that I believe Stichter’s view cannot explain and I try to identify the reasons for that. I argue that while trying to avoid the completely anti-intellectualist account of skill especially when it comes to virtue, Stichter (...) may have inadvertently presented an account that is too intellectualist. To clarify my claims, I start with a brief explanation of Stichter’s account of skill as self-regulation, a quick discussion of how he sees this as applying to virtue and then I turn to objections. I present cases in which the skill one acquires was never set as a goal to be achieved as Stichter’s picture would suggest, but simply comes as a byproduct of either aiming at developing a different skill or behaving in ways that don’t involve any goals at all. To this end, I discuss cases with no set goal and cases of transferable skills both in the moral and non-moral domains. I conclude that by defining virtue as self-regulation with a specific moral standard, Stichter may have violated one of the original motivations for the return to virtue ethics, namely that other views tend to over-intellectualize our moral behavior. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to establish that free agency, which is a capacity of many animals including human beings, is compatible with indeterminism: an indeterministic world allows for the existence of free agency. The question of the compatibility of free agency and indeterminism is less discussed than its mirror image, the question of the compatibility of free agency and determinism. It is, however, of great importance for our self-conception as free agents in our (arguably) indeterministic world. We begin (...) by explicating the notions of indeterminism and free agency and by clarifying the interrelation of free agency and the human-specific notion of free will. We then situate our claim of the compatibility of free agency and indeterminism precisely in the landscape of the current debate on freedom and determinism, exposing an unhappy asymmetry in that debate. Then we proceed to make our case by describing the mathematically precise, physically motivated model of projective simulation, which employs indeterminism as a central resource for agency modeling. We argue that an indeterministic process of deliberation modeled by the dynamics of projective simulation can exemplify free agency under indeterminism, thereby establishing our compatibility claim: Free agency can develop and thrive in an indeterministic world. (shrink)

Symptom Checker Applications (SCA) are mobile applications often designed for the end-user to assist with symptom assessment and self-triage. SCA are meant to provide the user with easily accessible information about their own health conditions. However, SCA raise questions regarding ethical, legal, and social aspects (ELSA), for example, regarding fair access to this new technology. The aim of this scoping review is to identify the ELSA of SCA in the scientific literature. A scoping review was conducted to identify the ELSA (...) of SCA. Ten databases (e.g., Web of Science and PubMed) were used. Studies on SCA that address ELSA, written in English or German, were included in the review. The ELSA of SCA were extracted and synthesized using qualitative content analysis. A total of 25,061 references were identified, of which 39 were included in the analysis. The identified aspects were allotted to three main categories: (1) Technology; (2) Individual Level; and (3) Healthcare system. The results show that there are controversial debates in the literature on the ethical and social challenges of SCA usage. Furthermore, the debates are characterised by a lack of a specific legal perspective and empirical data. The review provides an overview on the spectrum of ELSA regarding SCA. It offers guidance to stakeholders in the healthcare system, for example, patients, healthcare professionals, and insurance providers and could be used in future empirical research to investigate the perspectives of those affected, such as users. (shrink)

Background Symptom checker apps (SCAs) are mobile or online applications for lay people that usually have two main functions: symptom analysis and recommendations. SCAs ask users questions about their symptoms via a chatbot, give a list with possible causes, and provide a recommendation, such as seeing a physician. However, it is unclear whether the actual performance of a SCA corresponds to the users’ experiences. This qualitative study investigates the subjective perspectives of SCA users to close the empirical gap identified in (...) the literature and answers the following main research question: How do individuals (healthy users and patients) experience the usage of SCA, including their attitudes, expectations, motivations, and concerns regarding their SCA use? Methods A qualitative interview study was chosen to clarify the relatively unknown experience of SCA use. Semi-structured qualitative interviews with SCA users were carried out by two researchers in tandem via video call. Qualitative content analysis was selected as methodology for the data analysis. Results Fifteen interviews with SCA users were conducted and seven main categories identified: (1) Attitudes towards findings and recommendations, (2) Communication, (3) Contact with physicians, (4) Expectations (prior to use), (5) Motivations, (6) Risks, and (7) SCA-use for others. Conclusions The aspects identified in the analysis emphasise the specific perspective of SCA users and, at the same time, the immense scope of different experiences. Moreover, the study reveals ethical issues, such as relational aspects, that are often overlooked in debates on mHealth. Both empirical and ethical research is more needed, as the awareness of the subjective experience of those affected is an essential component in the responsible development and implementation of health apps such as SCA. Trial registration German Clinical Trials Register (DRKS): DRKS00022465. 07/08/2020. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:This essay presents a critical examination and development of an exchange between Adam Smith and David Hume on the nature of sympathy. I identify four objections to Smith's account in a letter from Hume and then argue that Smith's system has the resources to reply to all of them. As such, this essay shows that Smith's system provides a more robust foundation for a sentiment-based system of ethics than has been traditionally recognized.

In this article, I give an original objection to Frank Jackson's argument for the conclusion that the subjective, felt properties of experience are causally inert. I show that the very act of asserting the existence of these properties undermines the claim that they are epiphenomenal. If this objection goes through, it is fatal to the argument in question.

Can we sensibly attribute some of the happenings in our world to the agency of some of the things around us? We do this all the time, but there are conceptual challenges purporting to show that attributable agency, and specifically one of its most important subspecies, human free agency, is incoherent. We address these challenges in a novel way: rather than merely rebutting specific arguments, we discuss a concrete model that we claim positively illustrates attributable agency in an indeterministic setting. (...) The model, recently introduced by one of the authors in the context of artificial intelligence, shows that an agent with a sufficiently complex memory organization can employ indeterministic happenings in a meaningful way. We claim that these considerations successfully counter arguments against the coherence of libertarian free will. (shrink)

I have argued that to say qualia are epiphenomenal is to say a world without qualia would be physically identical to a world with qualia. Dan Cavedon-Taylor has offered an alternative interpretation of the commitments of qualia epiphenomenalism according to which qualia cause beliefs and those beliefs can and do cause changes to the physical world. I argue that neither of these options works for the qualia epiphenomenalist and thus that theory faces far more serious difficulties than has previously been (...) recognized. (shrink)

Der Band führt die Beiträge einer Reihe namhafter soziologischer Theoretiker zusammen, die sich mit dem Werk über die "Grundlagen der Sozialtheorie" von James S. Coleman auseinandersetzten. Die Edition dokumentiert die Vielzahl der Themen, denen Colemans Theorieentwurf neue und wichtige Anregungen verdankt. Besonders nachdrücklich diskutieren die Kommentatoren Colemans Bedeutung für die Weiterentwicklung der Theorien sozialer Normen, der Mikro-Makro-Problematik, der Theorie des Vertrauens, der Herrschaft und der Erziehung. Alle Beiträge nehmen Stellung zur Theorie rationalen Wahlhandelns, die James Coleman zur Fundierung seiner Handlungssystemanalysen (...) benutzt und die in jüngster Zeit zunehmend Raum und Beachtung gewinnt. (shrink)

Examining relativistic quantum field theory we claim that its description of subnuclear phenomena can be understood most adequately from a semiotic point of view. The paper starts off with a concise and non-technical outline of the firmly based aspects of relativistic quantum field theories. The particular methods, by which these different aspects have to be accessed, can be described as distinct facets of quantum field theory. They differ with respect to the relation between quantum fields and associated particles, and, as (...) we shall argue, should be interpreted as complementary (semiotic) codes. Viewing physical theories as symbolic constructions already came to the fore in the middle of the nineteenth century with the emancipation of the classical theory of the electromagnetic field from mechanics; most notably, as we will point out, with the work of Helmholtz, Hertz, Poincaré, and later on Weyl. Since the epistemological questions posed there are heightened with regard to quantum field theory, we considerably widen their approach and relate it to recent discussions in the philosophy of science, like structural realism and quasi-autonomous domains. (shrink)

Theories of free agency based on indeterminism -- that is, libertarian theories -- are often accused of undermining an agent's integrity: If an action is due to indeterministic happenings, how can it be called the agent's action to begin with? Isn't a deterministic connection between an agent's circumstances and her action needed to maintain her integrity? We claim that a meaningful notion of agency does not need determinism. In this paper we introduce stochastic libertarianism, a novel theory of free agency (...) under indeterminism. Based on a physically motivated, stochastic model of the temporal evolution of a deliberation process, stochastic libertarianism views indeterminism as a core resource for meaningful agency rather than as a threat. We counter the supposed threat by explicitly discussing Van Inwagen's replay argument, exposing a flaw in the argument that is due to insufficient attention to temporal details. Our approach can also explain how a stochastically libertarian agent developing over time can exhibit highly realiable behavior. We claim, therefore, that integrity in action does not need determinism. (shrink)

The study documents that the founding of the journal was the initiative of the publisher Hermann Niemeyer. It was the result of negotiations Niemeyer conducted mainly with Paul Kluckhohn and Erich Rothacker; the former sought for a literary-historical, the latter for a more scientific-philosophical orientation for the journal. The article concludes with an overview on the epistemic situation of literary studies between 1890 and 1920 which shows that the geistesgeschichtliche Bewegung emerged from an ideological reaction to the Kulturkrise and found (...) its way into the discipline of literary studies in various conceptions. (shrink)

Bei Nietzsches Texten handelt es sich häufig um Reaktionen auf seine breitgestreuten Lektüren. Sein Lesen ist zugleich ein Schreiben, und es verläuft ebenso selektiv und assoziativ wie aneignend: So werden unter Nietzsches Hand etwa Lesefrüchte aus naturwissenschaftlichen Lexika ästhetischen Überlegungen einverleibt oder ethno-anthropologische Fachbücher im Kontext philosophiegeschichtlicher Einordnungsversuche zitiert. Die Interpretation von Nietzsches Schriften ist daher stets auf eine philologisch-differenzierte Quellenarbeit angewiesen, die zugleich auch philosophisch-hermeneutischen Ansprüchen genügt. Nur so findet die spezifische Gemengelage aus Eigenem und Fremdem in Nietzsches Texten (...) ebenso adäquate Berücksichtigung wie die Vielzahl der handschriftlichen Lesespuren in den bis heute erhaltenen Büchern aus seiner persönlichen Bibliothek. In einer Reihe von Überblicksdarstellungen und exemplarischen Fallstudien unternimmt es der Band, Nietzsche im Spiegel seiner Lektüren als äußerst produktiven wie kreativen Leser zu charakterisieren, dessen Voraussetzungsreichtum nicht überschätzt werden kann. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Introduction The Gene in Classical Genetics The Gene in Molecular Genetics The Gene in Evolution and Development Conclusion: Genes, Genomics, and Reduction Acknowledgement References Further Reading.

This paper takes seriously the idea that one person in a workplace could cause a co-worker to feel ashamed without realising it. This is because the most widely accepted conception of shame does not adequately explain the eliciting conditions of that emotion. I begin by setting out what I take to be the most common account of shame. Next, I note what predictions we would make about which situations will elicit shame in a subject were we to embrace that conception. (...) I then show that these predictions are actually false in three cases out of four. A second analysis of shame is proposed as an alternative that makes better predictions about when shame will be elicited than the first account, and can explain more of the relevant phenomena even when the two accounts of shame make the same prediction about whether the emotion will be elicited in a given scenario. I close with a practical discussion of how this new conception of shame should inform workplace managers who encounter situations in which one worker feels harassed by a colleague and the accused does not understand why her actions made the other worker feel the way they did. (shrink)

IntroductionAlthough a few studies suggest that young overweight to obese children and adolescents may have impaired postural control compared to young normal-weight peers, little information exists about how these two groups differ in the quality of the underlying balance strategies employed. Hence, the aim of the present study was a first comprehensive examination of the structural complexity of postural sways in these two cohorts during quiet bilateral standing.MethodsNineteen YO secondary school students were carefully matched to YN controls for age, sex, (...) height, and school. Mediolateral and anteriorposterior acceleration signals were recorded with an inertial measurement unit positioned at the trunk while standing barefoot in two conditions: firm and foam support surface. The magnitude of postural fluctuations was obtained using the root mean square. The temporal structure of the signals was analyzed via sample entropy, largest Lyapunov exponent, and detrended fluctuation analysis algorithm. Reliability was assessed using a test–retest design.ResultsIn both groups, foam standing caused higher postural fluctuations and reduced structural complexity. In comparison to YN, YO exhibited a higher RMSAP. Especially in ML direction, the acceleration signals of the YO had higher repeatability, greater long-range correlations, and lower local stability. However, these observations were largely independent of the task difficulty. Except for α-DFAAP, the IMU approach proved reliable to characterize posture control.DiscussionOur outcomes confirm postural control deficits in YO compared to their YN peers and indicate impaired regulatory mechanisms reflected as rigidity. Such less complex patterns usually reflect diverse pathologies, are detrimental to compensate for internal or external perturbations, and are attributed to lower adaptability and task performance. Without targeted balance stimuli, YO likely end in a lifelong vicious circle of mutually dependent poor balance regulation and low physical activity. (shrink)

According to a mainstream position in contemporary cognitive science and philosophy, the use of abstract compositional concepts is amongst the most characteristic indicators of meaningful deliberative thought in an organism or agent. In this article, we show how the ability to develop and utilise abstract conceptual structures can be achieved by a particular kind of learning agent. More specifically, we provide and motivate a concrete operational definition of what it means for these agents to be in possession of abstract concepts, (...) before presenting an explicit example of a minimal architecture that supports this capability. We then proceed to demonstrate how the existence of abstract conceptual structures can be operationally useful in the process of employing previously acquired knowledge in the face of new experiences, thereby vindicating the natural conjecture that the cognitive functions of abstraction and generalisation are closely related. (shrink)

Our examination of the controversy surrounding the intentionalist conception of textual interpretation shows that the critics of this approach to questions of meaning and interpretation have so far failed to prove their case. The standard objections to intentionalism, on grounds of logical or empirical fallacy, cannot be maintained. We reconstruct the objections which have been raised in the literature against the intentional conception and discuss them as criticism of a conception hold to be inadequate with respect to the problem of (...) literary interpretation. In our evaluation of the intentional conception we conclude that it represents a perfectly ‘normal’ conception of meaning and interpretation, of a kind by no means inferior to other approaches adopted by the various disciplines concerned with interpreting texts. (shrink)